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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce 
awarding, inter alia, Respondent the parties' real property, 
subject to a lien in favor of Appellant based upon an equitable 
adjustment of the financial and property interests of the parties 
including, inter alia, consideration of amounts paid into the 
Union Pacific Retirement Fund for Appellant's sole benefit. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 25, 1979, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Third District Court Judge, of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
awarded Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce. In his Findings of Fact, 
the judge found that, inter alia, the equities in the parties' 
house and lot was Forty Thousand Eight Hundred and Ten Dollars 
($40,810.00), and that Plaintiff should be awarded this property 
subject to a lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of 
Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Sixty-six Dollars and 45/100, 
($16,166.45). The lien amount represents one-half (1/2) the equity 
in the property, less one-half (l/2) of the amount paid into the 
Railroad Retirement FUnd by Defendant during the course of the 
marriage. (R. 102) 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the Court below did not award 
any portion of Defendant/Appellant's retirement benefits to her, 
and, rather, properly exercised its discretion with regard to the 
issues and facts before it, and its decision should be affirmed, 
therefore. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
with the following corrections and supplementations: 
1) As to Appellant's reference to the Memorandum 
Decision (R. 84-86) on page 2 of his brief, it is submitted that 
the quoted paragraph represents a ruling, rather than a finding, 
of the court. (R. 85) 
2) The court more clearly set forth its decision with 
I"" (: 
regard to Defendant's retirement fund contributions in its 
Findings of Fact (R. 100, et. seq.), Conclusions of Law (R. 103 
et. seq.), and Decree of Divorce (R. 106, et. seq.). The 
Findings of Fact, in relevant part, provide: 
That the parties stipulated in open Court that 
the equity in the parties' house and lot is ... 
$40,810.00. Plaintiff should be awarded, as 
her sole and separate property, the parties' X 
said house and lot, which is located at 
12023 South 2240 West, Riverton, Utah, sub-
ject to a lien thereon in favor of defendant 
-2-
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in the amount of $16,166.45, which amount re-
presents 1/2 of the equity in the said house 
and lot, less 1/2 of the amount paid into the 
Union Pacific Retirement Fund by defendant 
from July 1, 1965, until April 1, 19780 
The Conclusions of Law provide, in relevant part: 
That plaintiff is entitled to be awarded the 
parties' house and lot located at 12023 South 
2240 West, Riverton, Utah, as her sole and 
separate property subject to a lien thereon 
in favor of defendant in the amount of 
$16,166.45, and plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay defendant the said $16,166.45, less 
1/2 of the cost of sale of said property 
when said property is sold, ••• (R. 104-105) 
The Decree of Divorce awarded the property, accordingly (R. 108), 
decreasing the lien by one-half the amount paid into the fund, 
not one-half of any property right with regard thereto or benefit 
therefrom. 
3) At no point in the proceedings below did Defendant-
Appellant raise nor does he now claim to have raised the issue 
of the lawfulness of considering the retirement fund contributions 
as part of the financial and property interests of the parties; 
even though he was aware of the issue as a result of a communica-
tion from the Railroad Retirement Board (R. 94). Further, 
Appellant does not claim to have objected to the introduction of 
evidence with regard to his contributions. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUE RAISED ON APPEAL WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE 
COURT BELOW, BUT, RATHER APPELLANT APPROVED OF WHAT HE NOW 
CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN ERROR, AND THE APPEAL SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE 
DISMISSED. 
It is well settled that a legal theory which was not 
raised at the trial Court, but is raised for the first time on 
appeal, must be disregarded by the Appellate Court. See Upton 
v. Heiselt 118 Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428, 432 (1950). 
Nothing in the record indicates that the issue regarding 
1:::1 
the lawfulness of considering the contributions made under the 
Railroad Retirement Act was raised below, either by objection to 
the admission of evidence, objection to the Court's ruling, or 
any other method. And, Appellant has not otherwise claimed in 
this Court that the issue was raised in the trial Court. 
The record clearly indicates that defendant affirma-
tively participated in the Court's consideration of the issue as 
to the amount of the contribution which was made during the course 
of the marriage. (R. 87, 88) At the time, Appellant knew of 
the case and holding upon which he bases his appeal. (R. 94) 
It is submitted, therefore, that defendant is estopped 
from claiming on appeal that the Court below erred in even con-
-4-
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sidering the contributions in making an equitable division of 
property. As was held by the Utah Supreme Court in Ludlow v. 
Colorado Animal By-Products Company 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 
at 354, (1943) : 
A party who takes a position which either 
leads a Court into error or by conduct 
approves the error committed by the Court, 
cannot later take advantage of such error 
in procedure. 
Defendant's appeal to this Court must be dismissed, 
because the issue was not raised below, and, further, because 
defendant is estopped ~rom claiming that the Court below erred 
in its ruling. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED CONTRIBUTIONS MADE 
BY DEFENDANT TOWARD THE RETIREMENT FUND IN CONSIDERING AN EQUIT-
ABLE ADJUSTMENT OF THE FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY INTERESTS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
In Utah, the trial Court in a divorce action has a con-
siderable latitude of discretion in making a disposition of the 
property of the parties in a fashion which it deems to be faiF, 
equitable and necessary for the protection and welfare of the 
parties. Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977). It is also 
settled that, in questioning the use of this discretion, 
[tJhe burden is upon the Appellant to pr9ve 
that there was a misunderstanding or mis-
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application of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error: or that evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings as made: or 
a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
Hansen v. Hansen 537 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah, 1975). It has also been 
settled by this Court that the trial Court has a responsibility to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of the financial and 
property interests so that the parties might reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis. See Searle v. Searle 522 
P.2d 697, at 700 (Utah, 1974), and Baker v. Baker 551P.2d1263, 
1265 (Utah, 1976). 
Appellant does not contend that the award in question 
amounts to a manifest injustice or abuse of discretion. Rather, 
it is contended by Appellant that the trial Court 11 *** imper-
missably 'anticipated' Appellant's payment of benefits by off-
setting one-half (1/2) of those benefits against the parties' 
equity in the home." See Appellant's Brief, page 6. 
Appellant submits that such an award is contrary to the 
ruling of Hisquierdo v. Hisguierdo 439 U.S. 572, 59 L. Ed 2d 1, 
99 S. Ct. ___ (1979). In the part of that opinion relevant to 
Appellant's contention, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that an award of property, under California's community property 
laws, which anticipates the benefits which would be obtained from 
-6-
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the Railroad Retirement Fund is prohibited under the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974 (45 USCS Section 231, et. seq.). See 
Hisquierdo, Suprao, 59 L. Ed 2d, at 15. 
A review of the record, however, clearly reveals that 
the Court did not award an interest in any benefits which may be 
derived from defendant's retirement fund. (See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, plus Decree of Divorce. R. 105 eto seq.) o 
In fact, there is no indication in the record that the court 
considered what value those benefits might have. The only evidence 
before it was as to the amount of contributions during the marital 
periodo (R. 91-92) 
Further, there was no indication that the Court decided 
that a property interest had vested in the defendant as a result 
of his contributions. 
Rather, the contributions, alone, were considered by 
the Court in equitably dividing the property. This is to be 
distinguished from the facts in Hisguierdo, wherein the California 
Court had anticipated benefits as a property right under its 
community property law and made its award according to that law. 
Hisquierdo, Supra., 59 L. Ed. 2d at 10. 
The Utah Court properly, equitably, divided the property 
interests. To consider contributions into a fund from which the 
defendant, only, may benefit in the future~ in the course of 
-7-
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making a division of the property does not constitute anticipation 
of a benefit in such a fashion as would be prevented under the 
Federal Statute. The Utah Court has considered the issue and so 
ruled in a case involving a comparable situation where it was 
contended that a bond, which was exempt from assignment, legal 
process or taxation under Federal law, could not be considered 
by the Court when dividing property in a divorce action. 
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452, 454, (1949). 
To consider the contributions to the retirement fund and 
divide the amount thereof as a financial interest of the parties 
is not the same as anticipating the eventual benefit. 
Likewise, a Court could consider amounts invested by 
one spouse in an investment which had not yet borne fruit, and 
which might possibly never bear fruit. In such a situation, the 
opposing spouse may not be able to share, or may not wish to 
share in the possible eventual return, the amount of which would 
be the subject of mere conjecture. In such a case, the Court 
might properly award the other spouse one-half of the invested 
dollarso 
Similarly, if a spouse attended a school to gain a 
professional license during the marriage, and then the parties 
were divorced, a Court might properly make an award of .one-half 
-8-
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of the amount of expense incurred in the schooling rather than 
forcing the second spouse to share the benefits which may or may 
not come in the future to the professional spouse as a result of 
the professional practice. 
To make such an award in any of these situations would 
be to equitably consider the financial interests, but not anti-
cipate the benefits. 
It is submitted, therefore, that it was clearly within 
the discretion of the trial Court to make the award in question, 
based upon the amount of money contributed, in an equitable ad-
justment of the financial and property interests of the parties. 
Further, to do so is not the same as anticipating benefits which 
may come to defendant from the Railroad's Retirement Fund. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that Appellant's appeal to this 
Court cannot be considered for the reason that the issue raised 
was not raised belowo Further, Appellant is estopped from 
bringing the appeal because he approved of the consideration of 
the contributions below and, for the first time, on appeal claims 
that said consideration was error. The appeal should, therefore, 
be dismissed. 
-9-
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Even if the Court considers the issue raised, it should 
find that the Court below properly exercised its equitable dis-
cretion in considering the contributions to the retirement fund 
as a financial interest and using the amount of said contributions 
as one basis for the equitable adjustment of the financial and 
property interests of the parties so that they may reconstruct 
their lives on a happy and useful basis. It is further submitted 
that to so consider the contributions actually made during the 
marriage is not the same as anticipating benefits which may come 
from the fund as a property right, at law, in a division of 
community property. I For these reasons, the trial Court 1 s findings, I 
conclusion and decree should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
SWANER AND TAYLOR ///·~7-------
-------_> '· . . ; 'i; .. // / 
/- - -· ·/If . By "- _,, .. ,,,. -~- / //-'. ------- ~--:.--· / 
ROBERT M. TAYLOR 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City-;/ Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7344 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent, Sylvia Torgerson 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
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JoAnn Blackburn, Jerome Mooney & JoAnn Blackburn, 356 South 300 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this day of February, 
1980. 
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